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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 09-4232 
_____________ 
                         
GENARDO DOMINGO MENDOZA, 
                                       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                          Respondent                          
_____________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA No. A073-577-601) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie Garcy 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 14, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL and AMBRO,  Circuit Judges  
and JONES, II,* District Judge. 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 15, 2011 )                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
__________________ 
 
* The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge 
 
 Genaro Domingo Mendoza, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions 
for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) 
affirming the Immigration Judge‟s decision that, because he was a crewman, 
Mendoza was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will deny the petition. 
I. 
 On June 17, 1994, Mendoza entered the United States at Los Angeles, 
California on a “C-1/D” visa and was issued an I-94 entry document that 
authorized him to remain in the country until July 16, 1994.  At his time of entry, 
Mendoza presented to U.S. immigration authorities a Seaman‟s Service Record 
Book, issued to him by the Philippine Coast Guard.  On August 16, 1994, 
Mendoza filed an application for asylum, on which he listed his “current 
immigration status” as “crewman.”  The application for asylum was denied. 
 In 2004, Mendoza was placed in removal hearings for failure to depart the 
United States.  After conceding removability, Mendoza requested relief in the 
form of cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and, in the 
alternative, voluntary departure.  Mendoza eventually withdrew his asylum 
application.  In 2006, the IJ found Mendoza statutorily ineligible for cancellation 
of removal under INA § 240A(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(1), because he entered 
3 
the United States as a crewman.
1
  Mendoza also filed a motion to terminate 
proceedings due to incorrect details in the Notice to Appear.  The IJ allowed the 
Department of Homeland Security to amend the Notice to Appear to include the 
correct details and then denied the motion to terminate because the amended 
details did not significantly modify the reason Mendoza was removable.   
 The BIA affirmed the IJ‟s decision on appeal, rejecting Mendoza‟s 
argument that he was not a crewman because at the time of his entry to the United 
States he did not have current employment upon a ship.  Regardless of whether he 
had ever been employed as a crewman, had any prior training or experience as a 
crewman, or had located future employment aboard a specific vessel, the Board 
found Mendoza entered the United States as a crewman because he “secured a visa 
as a crewman, entered the United States pursuant to that visa, arrived with the 
intention of working as a seaman, and identified himself as a crewman on his 
asylum application.”  Mendoza filed this timely petition for review. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review the question 
whether Mendoza is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA 
§ 240A(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(1), due to his status as a crewman.  “We apply 
substantial evidence review to agency findings of fact, departing from factual 
findings only where a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive at a 
                                              
1
 Under section 240A(c)(1)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, “an alien who 
entered the United States as a crewman subsequent to June 30, 1964” is ineligible 
for cancellation of removal. 
4 
contrary conclusion.” Mendez–Reyes v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 428 F.3d 187, 191 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
 In his petition for review, Mendoza repeats the same argument he made to 
the BIA:  because he was not employed as a crewman prior to his arrival, he 
cannot be considered a crewman for purposes of cancellation of removal.
2
  As the 
Board correctly noted, however, at the time of his entry Mendoza had secured a 
“C-1/D” visa (in its decision, the BIA explained: “The „D‟ on his visa indicated 
that he had been accorded „alien crewman‟ status under section 101(a)(15(D) of 
the Act.”); he possessed and presented to U.S. immigration authorities a document 
issued by the Philippine Coast Guard called a “Seaman‟s Service Record Book”; 
in a 1994 application for asylum, Mendoza listed his current immigration status as 
“crewman”; and he testified before the IJ that, when he entered the U.S. in 1994, 
he was planning on working on a ship.  Regardless of his previous or subsequent 
employment, substantial evidence supports the BIA‟s conclusion that Mendoza 
knowingly secured entry into the United States as a crewman. 
Accordingly, we will deny Mendoza's petition for review. 
                                              
2
 Mendoza also argues that he cannot be considered a crewman because he was 
issued an I-94 entry document admitting him as a C-1 alien in transit, rather than 
an I-95 entry document issued to alien crewman.  We agree with the Board that the 
pertinent inquiry is not the entry document U.S. immigration authorities issued to 
Mendoza upon his arrival to the United States, but whether the respondent was 
issued a visa as an alien crewman and entered the United States as a crewman.   
